Supplying War

First Edition Hb (1977) - Drawing on a very wide rang of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned--but rarely explored--by the vast majority of books on military history. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns wage in Europe during the last two centuries. Moreover, by concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, Dr. van Creveld is also able to offer a reinterpretation of the whole field of military history.

[Amazon Editorial Reviews] "I recommend this work for every professional army officer, but particularly those in the operational field who are used to moving units with the stroke of a grease pencil." --Major Michael D. Krause, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Customer Reviews] Logistics for the Armchair General By T. Graczewski on June 28, 2005: 'Those familiar with military history and strategic studies are likely familiar with Van Creveld and his proclivity for making bombastic and sweeping assertions on the nature of warfare. "Supplying War" is no exception. (By way of example, he labels Operation Overlord "an exercise in logistic pusillanimity unparalleled in modern military history.") Originally published in 1976, "Supplying War" was the first book to directly address the critical, but often ignored issues of logistics in warfare with a primary objective of identifying key themes and trends across time. Even Van Creveld's most trenchant critics - and he has many in the academic community - concede that his work was original and reached a large audience, and has therefore largely defined the debate on the subject. Van Creveld reviews seven historical case studies (17th century feudal warfare, Napoleon's invasion of Russia, the German invasion of France in 1870 and 1914, and Russia in 1940, Rommel's 1942 North African campaign and the Normandy invasion of 1944) and comes to the following general conclusion: In pre-modern military history food (including animal fodder) was the primary logistical concern and most armies were forced to keep moving to survive by living off the land; but the rise of the modern, mechanized army inverted the paradigm, as ammunition and fuel supplies became paramount and armies were increasingly tied to rear-area depots for their survival. "Supplying War" is as interesting and easy to read as a book on such an inherently dull topic can be. Given the broad impact the book has had serious students of military history will want to read it if only to understand Van Creveld's perspective and arguments. I would add, however, that no one should read "Supplying War" without also consulting the extremely thoughtful and hard-nosed critique of it written by John Lynn in "Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present." Lynn's essay points out a number of serious flaws in Van Creveld's approach and conclusions. For instance, Lynn notes that Van Creveld conveniently avoids the issue of naval logistics, which happens to undermine his argument that military forces have only recently been engaged in serious logistical planning. Unlike armies, from at least the time of the Spanish Armada navies have had to engage in sophisticated logistical planning to ensure they had enough food, water and ammunition to complete their mission, and with the arrival of steam power they had to worry about fuel as well. Lynn points out a number of other convenient omissions in Van Creveld's work, such as the successful use of railroads and steamboats for front-line supply in the US Civil War, the critical and successful role trans-Atlantic and -Pacific US logistics support played in both the First and Second World Wars, and the political constraints on 17th Century warfare that inhibited operations much more than logistical considerations. However, the most convincing (and damning) scrutiny of "Supply War" comes in a section titled "A problem with numbers?" in which Lynn comes very close to accusing Van Creveld of intellectual and academic dishonesty by twisting or misrepresenting quantitative data on the purported rise of ammunition and fuel as a percentage of the overall supply requirements and the selective quotation of certain sources'.'


Great Book By Tom Munro on March 8, 2001: 'First and foremost it is a picture of the changing pattern of war. It describes in the first chapter the sorts of campaigns which were run until the time of Napoleon. In those days ammunition would be the most minor problem for an army. Most soldiers could carry enough ammunition in their back pack for a campaign and in a major battle they would fire perhaps twenty or thirty times. In a siege a cannon might fire four or five times a day. The major problem was the provision of food for men and horses. Generally an army could take from the country enough to feed itself. Problems arose if an army stayed in place for any time. A siege would have the power to destroy an area of country by stripping it of everything edible. For these reason there developed a system of magazine storage for siege campaigns.
The next chapter discusses the Napoleonic period and the failure to set up a logistics system in Russia despite careful planning. This led to enormous French casualties and the collapse of the campaign.
The rest of the book looks at the Franco-Prussian War, the Schlieffen Plan , the German operations on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, the African Campaign and the operations in France following the break out from the initial beach heads. In discussing these campaigns the author charts the gradual change in logistics. The development of railway systems and integrating them into providing supplies. The development of modern weapons and the increase in the demand for ammunition and for fuel. The importance of motorised transport and the problems created in providing oil and spare parts.
Each of the campaigns discussed is done so in a way that brings new light onto the mechanics of the campaign and in our ability to understand what happened. The Russian campaign is fascinating as it shows how tough was the problem faced by the Germans. They were able to cobble together large numbers of trucks to supply their troops but were never in the position to replace them once they began to wear out. The amount of ammunition stockpiled was also barely enough for a campaign of four weeks. The German effort in doing as well as they did was incredible but once the Soviets were able to hang on through the initial period then the odds started to swing their way. Germany's supply problems were shown by their in ability to supply winter uniforms and this led to massive casualties from frost bite.
One of the most fascinating chapters is on Rommel and his campaigns. The material in the book has been quoted elsewhere. In previous times it has been thought that Rommel failed in Africa because of the allies intercepted supply conveys and sunk material on route. The book shows that supplies to Africa were not the problem. The problem in supplying Rommel related moving those supplies the enormous distances to the front. The book suggests that the German High Command knew that this would be a problem and they ordered Rommel to restrict any advances. As we know he disobeyed these orders and won a number of significant victories against the British. What the book shows is that although a tactical genius he had little grasp of strategy'.'


[About the Author] Martin van Creveld is a Professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University, Jersualem. His previous books include The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge, 1999), The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (2002), Air Power and Manoeuvre Warfare (2002) and Transformation of War (1991).

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