WIRED FOR WAR - The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century

P. W. Singer

Penguin

2009

400 páginas

13h 20m

ISBN-10: 1594201986

After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, there was a fusillade of
remarks about how American technological superiority was th
decisive factor in how we won the war. General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf would have none of this. He stated that altho
our weapons and equipment were indeed technologically
superior to those of the Iraqis, we would have won the war if w
had had their equipment, and they had had ours. P.W. Singer
would have done well to ponder this remark
re
The very first line of the book responds to a chapter title: “Wh
a book on robots and war?” His answer: “Because robots are
frakin’ cool.” And indeed they are. Singer takes us on a fascinating tour of the current
and predicted state of military robotics. We get a comprehensive survey, from potential
nanotechnologies that might create machines utterly invisible to the naked eye;
robots of lawn-mower size doing good service for American troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan; to the potential for truly intelligent, self-aware, and autonomous military
robots that he says may exist within a couple of decades. He quite properly conc
more than anything else, on the tremendous growth just in the past few years of
unmanned aircraft from dragonfly to jet fighter size—and here I think he is on his firm
ground in suggesting that war in the air may be changed more by robots than naval or
ground warfare. Furthermore, Singer doesn’t confine himself to technical material, but
does his best to explore the long-term social and philosophical results of the increased
automation of warfighting. He c
c
But when one thinks something is “frakin’ cool,” one has a tendency to avoid some
inconvenient truths—or to latch on to some things which one thinks are true but which
ain’t so. So it is with Singer. Somebody, in the course of his very extensive research,
should have dumped a bucket of military-historical cold water on him. Perhaps the k
problem with his assertions are embodied in his one sentence (p. 263): “The Un
States may be the most powerful nation-state in history, largely because of its
technology.” Well, no. Not really. Our technology wasn’t superior to that of t
Germans, our primary enemy, in World War II—our productive capacity, our
organizational skills, and ultimately our strategic insights were. We weren’t stalem
in Iraq for three years because our technology was inferior, and we didn’t turn the
situation around because our technology got better. And we don’t prevail on the tactica
level in Iraq and Afghanistan because of our technology, but because our soldiers and
Marines are superbly trained, well led, are willing not only to risk their lives, but equally
willing and ready to close with and kill the enemy with personal weapons. Infantrymen
will tell you that the technology that we’ve placed at their disposal, including the robots
that Singer describes, is sometimes useful, often marginal, occasionally more trouble th
it’s worth, and can never replace a good grunt who knows what he is doing. The late,
great science-fiction writer Poul Anderson said it best (Satan’s World, New York: Lanc
Books, 1968, pp. 165-66): robots, even the self-aware ones that Singer says will come,
can never match the human being in fundamental decision-making capability. “…the
biological creature has available to him so much more physical organization. Besides
sensor-computer-effector systems comparable to those of the machine, he has feed-in
from glands, fluids, chemistry reaching down to the molecular level—the integrated
ultracomplexity, the entire battery of instincts—that a billion-odd years of ruthlessl
selective evolution have brought forth. He perceives and thinks with a wholeness
transcending any po
ated
l
an
er
y
ssible symbolism; his purposes arise from within, and therefore are
finitely flexible.”
g to
be
reak
e
re
viewer, Singer, and the current SWJ
adership and staff are long in their graves.
in
Even if the skeptics are wrong about the ultimate transformative power of military
robotics, one thing is virtually certain: it will happen much later than sooner, and it will
take a lot longer than Singer thinks. Technology addicts fail to remember that everything
always takes longer and costs more, the natural and unavoidable consequence of the fact
that the people who develop these things are natural optimists. Were they otherwise, they
wouldn’t even try. Furthermore, Singer buys into the hoary old chestnut that reactionary
military men don’t “adapt well to new technologies.” (p. 251) Actually, few institutions
adapt to new technologies better and faster than the military—the penalties for failin
do so are higher than in the civilian world. New technology takes a long time to
integrated into warfighting, and for very good reasons. Things that work in the
laboratory, or on test trials, frequently don’t stand up on the battlefield. New things b
down. They have unforeseen effects. Thus, Singer tells us that reactionary generals
prevented the adoption of repeating rifles for the infantry in the Civil War, and failed to
instantly acquire machine guns when they were first invented. All of these things were
for good reason. The first repeating rifles jammed easily and had much less stopping
power, at shorter ranges, than the single-shot Civil War muskets—Union Army cavalry
with repeaters was unable to hold Confederate infantry armed with muskets right up to
Appomattox. Similarly, the first machine guns were balky, extraordinarily heavy, and
hard to supply with ammunition. Singer thinks that they would have turned the tide for
Custer at the Little Big Horn; actually, they were so unreliable and immobile that Sitting
Bull would still have counted coup on Yellow Hair. So, it is virtually certain, will be th
case with military robotics—if they turn out to be the most decisive change in warfa
since gunpowder, it’ll happen long after this reviewer, Singer, and the current SWJ readership and staff are long in their graves.
So read Wired for War. It’s chock full of interesting stuff. But when you’re reading it,
never forget that ground war (Singer is much more on target regarding war in the air) is
ultimately pre-industrial, pre-modern, and in fact primeval—just like human beings
themselves, when the thin veneer of civilization is stripped away by reality.
Robert L. Goldich is a defense consultant and military historian. He retired in 2005 after
a 33-year career with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, as a
defense analyst.